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THE EXTRATERRITORIAL DECREE OF
DIVORCE

T

HE paramount importance of the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Wilians and Hendrix v.
State of Nortk Carolina, decided on December 21st, 1942,

cannot be over-estimated or over-emphasized.1 It stamped
the indicia of legality on eo parte migratory divorces predicated upon the domicile of one spouse, coupled with constructive service of process on the other, and compelled their
recognition throughout the length and breadth of the several

states of the Union.
A new formula has been formulated in place of the old

to sustain the jurisdictional facts essential to grant a divorce
extra-territorial effect.

The establishment of a bona fide

domicile by one spouse in a state other than the home state,
coupled with constructive service of process, is sufficient to

confer jurisdiction on a sister state and compel its recognition by the several states of the Union.
States like New York and Massachusetts will be most
seriously affected by this determination. Heretofore, New
York, despite the establishment of a bona fide domicile by
the petitioner in a sister state, refused to recognize a divorce
obtained in a sister state by constructive service of process
against one of its citizens.2 This rule no longer prevails.
I Williams and ano. v. The State of North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 87
L. ed. 189 (1942).

2 Kaiser v. Kaiser, 192 App. Div. 40, aff'd withwut ophntim, 233 N. Y. 524,
135 N. E. 902 (1922).
The opinion of the Appellate Division, written by Mr. Justice Page,
stated:
"Although it is not valid and binding in other states as a matter of
right, under the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution (Art. 4, Sec. 1), it may be recognized in other states by Comity.
This State has consistently refused to recognize such a decree as binding upon a party who, at the time of the action in a foreign State,
was a citizen of this State, on the ground that it was contrary to our
public policy (See cases collected in Berney v. Adriance, 157 A. D. 628,
63(), and the right to refuse recognition has been sustained by the
United States Supreme Court (Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155,
Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, Thompson v. Thompson, 226
U. S. 551, 561)."
Percival v. Percival, 106 App. Div. 111, aff'd without opinion, 186 N. Y.
587, 79 N. E. 1114 (1906).
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The Supreme Court has. overruled the New York doctrine
devised to protect its citizens against eo parte migratory
divorces. Under the law, as announced in the Williams case,
a New York citizen is able to establish a domicile in Reno,
secure a divorce there from his stay-at-home spouse, and
New York would be constrained to give it full force and effect
under and by virtue of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of
the United States Constitution.
This decision marks a fundamental and far-reaching
change in the conception of the jurisdiction of the Courts of
a state to render a decree of divorce which will be entitled
to extraterritorial effect under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the Constitution. Jurisdiction is now predicated
upon domicile of one spouse, coupled with constructive service upon the other. The fiction of the matrimonial res, which
attached, itself to the deserted spouse, has been discarded
in favor of the simpler domicile doctrine. Fault is no longer
an element of jurisdiction. The migratory spouse might be
entirely at fault in the matrimonial rift. Nevertheless, this
The Appellate Division reaffirmed the principles stated in numerous cases:

"And as the Courts have said, the policy of this State is enforced for
the protection of its own citizens domiciled here, whose status should
not be changed by foreign degree . . . but it seems to me that when
this principle of State policy is invoked, the party invoking it must
bring himself within its protection. I think when he attacks a foreign
decree entered against him without personal service on the ground
that the foreign court was without jurisdiction he must show that he
was a resident of New York State at the time the foreign decree was
obtained."
The logic behind this rule, protecting spouses domiciled in this state, rests
on strong, practical considerations. It prevents a spouse from even setting up
a bonq fide domicile in another state and there establish grounds, pursuant to
its lax laws of divorce, against a resident of this state.
Heller v. Heller, 285 N. Y. 572, 33 N. E. (2d) 247 (1941).
An anomalous situation is presented by the Court of Appeals decision in
this case. The New York Court of Appeals, for the first time, applied the
doctrine of comity to a sister state decree of divorce obtained against the resident of this state. The defendant wife had secured a divorce by publication in
Nevada from her "former husband", a New York resident who did not appear
in the action. She had previously obtained from her "former husband" a judgment of separation in the New York courts. Her second husband sued for an
annulment on the ground that she had not been legally divorced. The relief
was denied. The memorandum opinion in the Heller case is so terse that it
may be pardonable to quote it verbatim.
'iWithout deciding whether the plaintiff is estopped from prosecuting
the action for annulment, we hold that the validity of the decree of
divorce granted in the State of Nevada will be recognized in this
State under the rule of comity."
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is immaterial to the issue, so long as the petitioner establishes a domicile and complies with one of the statutory
grounds for divorce in the sister state. The matrimonial res
of yesterday has been superseded by the domicile issue of
3

today.

3 Beale, Haddock Revisited (1926) 39 HAv. L. REv. 417; McClintock,
Fault as an Element of Divorce Jurisdiction (1928) 36 YALE L. J. 564; Matter
of Bingham's Estate, 265 App. Div. 463, 41 N. Y. S. (2d) 180 (1943).
Mr. Justice Lewis, writing for the court; in a unanimous decision, tated:
"All that the majority purported to do in the Williams case was to
overrule Haddock v. Haddock (201 U. S. 562) and to remove from the
question of full faith and credit consideration of the subsidiary question
whether the person who had removed from the matrimonial domicile
had wrongfully done so. The Supreme Court in the Williams case did
not eliminate domicile as a foundation for jurisdiction."
Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that though the Appellate Division
in the Bingham case, supra, denied the validity of a Nevada divorce secured by
constructive service of process, it nevertheless held the petitioner estopped from
questioning the validity of the illegal Nevada decree of divorce secured by his
wife by reason of his remarriage following the divorce.
McCarthy v. McCarthy, 179 Misc. 623, 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 922 (1943).
Mr. Justice Garvin, in that case, wrote:
"This court has had an opportunity of observing the witnesses upon
the stand and their demeanor, and has reached the conclusion that plaintiff abandoned defendant without reasonable cause. However, in the
light of the prevailing opinion of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Williams and ano. v. State of North Carolina, decided Dtcember 21, 1942 (N. Y. L. J., December 28, 1942, 87 Law Ed., 189).
this abandonment is no longer of any importance upon the issue of
domicile in deciding whether or not a valid judgment of divorce was
obtained in Nevada."
As recently as October 18, 1943, the Appellate Division, Second Department, in Gibson v. Gibson, 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 372, turned the clock backward
when it predicated its decision upon the principle of the matrimonial res. The
court stated in a memorandum opinion:
"The wife having prevailed in the separation action because of the
husband's fault, the matrimqnial res remained with the wife in New
York and the wrongdoer is disabled from moving the res out of
New York so as to give jurisdiction thereof in any other State, in the
absence of an appearance by the wife."
The doctrine of the matrimonial res was disowned by the same court in
an earlier decision, decided soon after the Williams-Hendrix case. (Matter
of Bingham's Estate, supra.)
In each of these cases, in view of the factual situation, an equitable result
was obtained, but the principle of the marital res is not the sole principle in
the legal armory.
On November 24, 1943 the Court of Appeals in the Matter of Holmes
by a divided court, 4 to 3, held that in the absence of affirmative proof of lack of
jurisdiction a divorce secured in a sister state is stamped with a presumption of
legality. It held further that a decree of divorce subsequently obtained in New
York against the petitioner in the Nevada Fourt was not conclusive evidence of
the lack of domicile of the petitioner in hi Nevada divorce action in litigation
between the petitioner and a person not a party to the divorce. The majority
opinion written by Lehman, Ch. J., specifically asserted that it will remain an
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From one angle of approach, the Wifliam-Hendrix case
is highly commendable. In the instant case, it may be no
more than substantial justice to refuse to sustain the conviction of bigamous cohabitation in the State of North Carolina, where one sovereign state of the Union places the imprimatur of divorce on a marital relationship prior to the
second marriage. Nevertheless, when the Court of Appeals
in
of New York was faced with the converse of the situation
4
the William case it sustained a conviction of bigamy.
The prevailing opinion in the Williams case, was predicated on the premise that the petitioner's lawful domicile
was in Nevada at the time of the institution of the divorce
action. This immediately raises the question as to the forum
that would be the final arbiter of the issue of residence versus
domicile.
It is unfortunate for the development of the law in this
field that this issue is shrouded in doubt and it will take
another Supreme Court decision to resolve it. North Carolina
conceded and the Supreme Court by-passed this vital issue,
which will arise to harrow matrimonial litigants in days
to come.
Mr. Justice Jackson, in his dissenting opinion, predicted
that as a necessary result of the majority opinion, the
final word on the issue of domicile would vest "in the first
state to pass on the facts necessary to jurisdiction."
Mr. Justice Douglas, who delivered the majority opinion
for the Court, specifically stated, in reference to the effect
of the lack of a bona fide domicile:
We have no occasion' to meet that issue now, and we intimate no
opinion upon it.
The Court pointedly refused to consider the question of residence as distinguished from domicile, as sufficient to confer
jurisdiction on the sister state to grant the divorce. Apparently, residence is insufficient as a basis of jurisdiction,
open question until the U. S. Supreme Court passes on it whether a finding of
domicile by a court of a sister state can be annulled and its decree rendered a
nullity in another state court.
4People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78 (1879).
The non-consenting, non-migratory husband had been divorced by his wife
by constructive service of process. -He thereafter remarried. The New York
courts sustained his conviction for bigamy.
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inasmuch as the majority opinion cited with approval its
earlier decision in Bell v. Bell,5 which held that where

neither spouse was domiciled in the divorcing state, the
decree was not entitled to the protection of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.
In the Williarns case, domicile was established in Nevada

by residence, for about six weeks, at the Alamo Auto Court,
"an address hardly suggestive of permanence," on the Las

Vegas-Los Angeles Road, and despite petitioner's testimony
that his residence in Nevada was "indefinite permanent" in

character. The New York Courts would have held, as a
matter of law, that these facts do not constitute a bona, fide
domicile.
Implicit in the majority and concurring opinions is an
attempt to formulate a doctrine which would prevent "the
complicated and serious condition" if "one is lawfully divorced and remarried in Nevada and still married to the
first spouse in North Carolina." The majority of the Court
sought to avoid this anomalous situation and to give uniformity to the law of marriage and divorce, by compelling
recognition of divorces granted in one state by all the states
of the Union. It is a necessary corollary of this doctrine

that the first state to pass on the issue of domicile would have
the final and last word on that all-important issue.
The Appellate Division, Second Department, as well as
many lower court decisions have refused to apply this corollary and have held that the issues of the bona fides of the
domicile in the divorcing state was properly before them for
5 Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175, 45 L. ed. 804 (1901).

6 Lefferts v. Lefferts, 228 App. Div. 37, aff'd, 263 N. Y. 131, 188 N. E. 279

(1933).
The establishment of domicile is not so facile a task as far as the New
York courts are concerned, as has been demonstrated by the Lefferts case. In
that case, the migratory spouse not only (a) took an apartment of three rooms
and kept house for herself and her two children, but (b) sent them to school,
and (c) voted in the local election. Nevertheless, this was held inadequate to
establish domicile in view of (1) her return to New York within a month after
the decree was granted, (2) her statement in an affidavit that she was a resident of New York, two months thereafter. These facts were deemed insufficient by the Appellate Division, as a matter of law, to warrant a finding of
domicile and the Court of Appeals refused to reverse this decision as contrary
to the weight of evidence.
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adjudication. 7 The opinion of the Appellate Division written
7 Matter of Bingham's Estate, 265 App. Div. (2d) 463, 41 N. Y. S. (2d)
180 (1943) ; Selkowitz v. Selkowitz, 179 Misc. 608, 40 N. Y. S. (2d) 9 (1943) ;
Jiranek v. Jiranek, 179 Misc. 502, 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 523 (1943) ; McCarthy v.
McCarthy, 179 Misc. 623, 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 922 (1943) ; McKee v. McKee, 179
Misc. 617, 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 859 (1943); Meyers v. Meyers, 179 Misc. 680,
40 N. Y. S. (2d) 444 (1943); Baker v. Baker, 179 Misc. 1023, 40 N. Y. S.
(2d) 445 (1943); Gerard v. Gerard, 179 Misc. 798, 41 N. Y. S. (2d) 77
(1943) ; Reese v. Reese, 179 Misc. 665, 40 N. Y. S. (2d) 468 (1943) ; Fondiller
v. Fondiller, 179 Misc. 800, 41 N. Y. S. (2d) 124 (1943); Fondiller v.
Fondiller, 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 477 (1943) ; "Standish" v. "Standish", 179 Misc.
564, 40 N. Y. S. (2d) 538 (1943); Buvinger v. Buvinger, 42 N. Y. S. (2d)
848 (1943); Jolby v. Jolby, 42 N. Y. S., (2d) 855 (1943).
The opinion of Mr. Justice McGeehan in Selkowits v. Selkozeto was the
first of probably many attempts to graft exceptions to avoid the "unduly harsh"
application of the principle of the Williams-Hendrix case to the non-consenting,
non-migrating spouse.
To the same effect Jiranek v. iranek, where Mr. Justice Witshief, at
Special Term, of thb Supreme Court, Westchester County, held that the
Williams-Hendrix case did not preclude the New York courts from testing the
issue of the bona fideness of the domicile acquired by the petitioner in the
Nevada divorce action. The reasoning of this case was subsequently followed
by the Appellate Division, Second Department, and by practically all of the
Justices sitting at Special Term of the Supreme Court.
In the McKee case, supra, Mr. Justice Koch properly applies the rule ofres adjudicata.as to all decrees of divorce and separation heretofore rendered.
This stabilizes the matrimonial status of all litigants whose cases have heretofore been adjudicated and wherein the right to appeal has expired.
In, the Reese case, supra, the opinion of Mr. Justice Hallinan contains an
excellent exposition of the issue of domicile vs. residence. It goes further than
any other recorded case in holding that the factual situation presented, failed
to establish domicile. In that case the defendant secured his divorce in Florida,
where he (a) occupied an apartment of two rooms;
(b) set up a business at Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, which he still carried on
through an employee though at a loss;
(c) he remarried in Florida and went to Ohio shortly afterwards to resist
his wife's claim to certain property;
(d) the defendant testified he intended to make Florida his permanent
home and that he left Florida because he had been placed in 1-A by the Local
Selective Service Board in Queens, New York;
(e) from Ohio he moved to Greenwich, Connecticut, where he now resides.
An apparently different view was taken by ,Mr. Justice Steuer in Fondiler
v. Fondiller, supra. His opinion indicates that the logic of the decision in
Williams v. North Carolinacompels recognition of the divorce decrees of sister
states where the decree of the sister state contains a fact finding of domicile.
Whether this finding can be attacked and the judgment avoided because the
finding of fact was predicated on perjured testimony must be resolved by the
law of the state of Nevada. In New York such an attack on the judgment
would not be countenanced (Arcuri v. Arcuri, 265 N. Y. 358). The court held
that since a Nevada decree was involved in this suit the law of that state on
this issue must govern. The Fondiller case was subsequently passed upon by
Mr. Justice McLaughlin on defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint. The
court expressly refused to follow the "persuasive" reasoning of Mr. Justice
Steuer, relying on the Bingham case as stare decises of this case.
In the "Standish" case, supra, the court found as a fact that domicile in the
sister state had been established and this, coupled with constructive service, was
held sufficient to require the courts of this state to recognize the Florida decree
of divorce.
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by Mr. Justice Lewis, pointed out that Haddock '. Haddock,
201 U. S. 562, was overruled only in so far as it required
consideration of the "subsidiary question whether the person
who had removed from the matrimonial domicile had wrongfully done so."
The theory of fault is no longer a factor in divorce jurisdiction. The essential factor is domicile. The establishment
of a bona fide domicile by the migratory spouse, coupled with
constructive service of process on the non-migratory spouse,
is sufficient to confer juirisdiction on the sister state and to
compel recognition of its decree of divorce throughout the
several states of the Union.
Discussion as to this point concerned itself primarily
with fundamental legal concepts, without considering the
human realities behind the doctrines. Do the two square
with each other? While it may be justice to Mr. Williams
and Mrs. Hendrix to obtain their divorces so that they could
marry each other, what of the position and condition of Mrs.
Williams and the four children of the marriage, and of Mr.
Hendrix? These spouses did not enter an appearance in
the Nevada actions, nor were they served with process in
Nevada. Mr. Hendrix was served by publication in a Las
Vegas newspaper, and by mailing a copy of the summons
and complaint to his last post office address. Mrs. Williams
I

The learned and exhaustive opinion of Mr. Justice Sicher takes issue with
Mr. Justice Steuer on the issue as to which forum, the divorce state or the
home state, should determine the factum of the bona fideness of the domicile.
Mr. Justice Sicher stated:
"Want of jurisdiction over the person or subject matter is always
open to inquiry (Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S., 457), notwithstanding
the recital of jurisdictional facts in the sister state decree, which may
be questioned collaterally also for fraud (Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N. Y., 217;
Kerr v. Kerr, 41 N. Y., 472; ef. Watters v. Watters, 259 App. Div.
611, "Conceivably,
613). .... the United States Supreme Court may ultimately
determine that the first state's adjudication that the procurer of the
divorce decree was a bona fide domiciliary of that state is binding on
the courts of the second state, under the theory that 'the full faith and
credit clause of the Constitution precludes any inquiry into the merits
of the cause of action, the logic or consistency of the decision or the
validity of the legal principle on which it was based' (Milliken v.
Meyer, supra, at p. 462; Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S., 230)."
In all of the cases cited, domicile, as distinguished from residence, it was
held, must be established. The difference of opinion rests in the divergent
views respecting the forum that should be the final arbiter of the isspe of
residence vs. domicile.
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was served personally in North Carolina. It requires
no argument at all to point out that publication in ajocal
newspaper is no actual notice at all and that" mailing to
the last known address of the defendant is often a perfunctory gesture. The Supreme Court would have reached the
same decision had neither Mrs. Williams nor Mr. Hendrix
had actual notice of a divorce until after it was a fait
accompli.
Are the issue of marriages to be the children of divorce
on the application of one parent in a remote jurisdiction,
and under lax divorce laws? 8 It would appear as if the
majority of the Supreme Court focused all of its attention
on the spouses before the Court, and entirely forgot about
the spouses and the children who remained at home.
Small wonder that Mr. Justice Jackson asserted that it
was easier and simpler to obtain a judgment of divorce that
was entitled to extraterritorial effect than it was to obtain
a judgment on a grocer's bill, that would be entitled to the
protection of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution. In the suit on the grocer's bill, the complainant
could not pick out the jurisdiction of his choice for suit, but
would be confined to the jurisdiction where the customer
resided. The complainant in a divorce suit, however, can
pick and choose a remote state of lax divorce laws to bring
his action.
In the divorce action, there is good reason to believe
that the defendant may not learn of the divorce until after
the decree is signed, sealed and delivered. This situation is
hardly conceivable in an ordinary commercial action. Assuming even that the defendant in the matrimonial action
gains knowledge of the commencement of the suit, and is
destitute and without means to travel to another state and
defend the action, the law affords no relief. Apparently,
spouses, who are being divorced, have no right to be indigent.
Mr. -Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion,
states that this decision would
s In the Hendrix case, the extreme mental cruelty sufficient to sustain the

divorce, consisted of the following facts: The complainant testified the husband
was "moody" and did not speak to her "often." When she spoke to him, he
answered, most of the time, with a nod or shake of the head, and "there was
nothing cheerful about him at all."
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contribute uniformity to the law of marriage and divorce, and that
is to enforce respect for the judgment of a state by its sister states.

By compelling North Carolina to grant extraterritorial effect
to the judgment of divorce of Nevada, uniformity is served,
but is it worth the price? Did not the late lamented Mr.
Justice Cardozo teach us that at times we could pay too high
a price for uniformity and that the judicial process must not
lose sight of the method of sociology in rendering its decision? 1
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, towards the close of his opinion,

further stated:
For all, but a small fraction of the community, the niceties of resolving such conflicts among the laws of the state are, in all likelihood,
matters of complete indifference. Our occasional pronouncements
upon the requirements upon the Full Faith and Credit Clause doubtless have little effect upon divorces.
This statement is open to serious dispute.

This decision of

the Court will open the door and pave the way to a flood
of divorce litigation in sister states.

An avenue has been

opened that was heretofore closed. Dissatisfied spouses will
not hesitate to jump state lines and terminate an unsatisfactory marital alliance. 10
9 BENJAMIN N. CARDOzO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 98.

"But the truth is that there is no branch where the method is not
fruitful. Even when it does not seem to dominate, it is always in
reserve. It is the arbiter between other methods, determining in the
last analysis the choice of each, weighing their competing claims, setting bounds to their pretensions, balancing and moderating and harmonizing them all. Few rules in our time are so well established that
they may not be called upon any day to justify their existence as means
adapted to an end. If they do not function, they are diseased. If
they are diseased, they must not propagate their kind. Sometimes they
are cut out and extirpated altogether. Sometimes they are left with
the shadow of continued life but sterilized, truncated, impotent for
harm."
10 There is a line of matrimonial cases represented by Davis v. Davis, 279
N. Y. 87, 17 N. E. (2d) 779 (1938) and Schein v. Schein, 169 Misc. 608 (1938)
that is a blot on our jurisprudence.
In the Davis case, the Court of Appeals held that a "husband" is entitled
to an annulment of his marriage, when his "wife" had been divorced by publication. And this, despite a child by this marriage.' In the Schein case, the
plaintiff had been previously married to one Williams. Desirous of a divorce
from him, she was advised by her present husband, who was incidentally an
attorney, to secure a divorce in the State of Illinois. He assured her that the
divorce there obtained would be valid in New York. It was held that the
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This decision should bring to the fore the urgency of
granting to Congress power to legislate in the field of marriage and divorce. Forty-eight sovereign states, with their
forty-eight varieties on the theme, are not a salutory condition of affairs. It has created the paradoxical situation of a
person being married in one state, divorced in another and
in a dilemma in a third.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause per se is the heart
of the Constitution. On the anvil of this clause the several
states are forged into a nation. The fault is not with the
clause, or its interpretation, but with the basic jurisdictional
procedural standards that have been formulated by the
courts, applicable solely to the dissolution of marriages. In
matrimonial litigation exclusively, the Full Faith and Credit
Clause has been circumscribed by procedural requirements
that render the clause inadvertently into an instrument of
inequity.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, nevertheless, illuminated the
way to a solution of the matrimonial labyrinth. Since 1884,
he explained, numerous attempts were made to amend the
Constitution to confer authority on Congress to enact legisIllinois decree of divorce, secured by constructive service of process, was absolutely void and, therefore, the plaintiff could not have legally remarried.
An equitable result is attained in these cases if a bona fide domicile is
established in the divorcing state but this was of rare occurrence.
Mr. Justice Collins, conscious of the injustice that was legally being perpetrated on the wife, stated:
"And were this a matter of chivalry, I would be disposed to censure the defendant's conduct in asserting the invalidity of the Illinois
divorce after his marriage to the plaintiff with knowledge of the circumstances attending the divorce and after living with her as husband
and wife for about seven years. But the concern here is with the law
and not with the proper conduct that befits a gentleman. The case is
controlled by rules of law, not those of knighthood."
The Court took further occasion to declare:
"This result, to be sure, permits the defendant to profit by his own
wrong. Unfortunately, however, the law as presently fixed forbids a
contrary holding."
The challenge of the court in this case should not go unheeded. When law
and justice travel in opposite paths, and the judges themselves are cognizant of
the wrong that is being committed in the name of the law, it is high time to
mould the law into the grooves of justice.
Slater v. Kenny, 265 App. Div. 963, 38 N. Y. S. (2d) 595 (1942) ; Heusner
v. Heusner, 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 850 (1943). Contra and in accord with the
equities of the situation: Honig v. Honig, 43 N. Y. S. (2d) 219 (1943), following Kaufman v. Kaufman, 177 App. Div. 162, 163 N. Y. Supp. 566 (1917)
and Oldham v. Oldham, 174 Misc. 22, 19 N. Y. S. (2d) 667 (1940).
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lation to govern the entire field of marriage and divorce in
the United States.
The need for securing national uniformity in dealing with divorce,
either through Constitutional amendment or by some other means,

has long been the concern of the Conference of Governors . . .
The urgency, now that the floodgates of interstate ex
parte migratory divorce have been thrown open, is imminent.
In the absence of "other means," a Constitutional amendment must be passed to grant to Congress exclusive jurisdiction to govern and control the entire field of marriage
and divorce.
J. M. RADIN.
261 Broadway, New York, N. Y.

